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DOES "PROCEEDS" REALLY MEAN "NET
PROFITS"? THE SUPREME COURT'S EFFORTS TO
DIMINISH THE UTILITY OF THE FEDERAL MONEY
LAUNDERING STATUTE
Jimmy Gurul61
INTRODUCTION
Drug traffickers, mobsters, white collar criminals, and terrorist
financiers must be breathing a huge sigh of relief. In United States v.
Santos, a deeply divided Supreme Court held that the undefined term
"proceeds" in the federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1), is limited to the net profits, not gross receipts, of
unlawful activity.' The Supreme Court's ruling restricts the scope of
the money laundering statute. After Santos, the statute only punishes
"financial transactions" 2 with illicit profits derived from "specified
unlawful activity," 3 not any funds derived from or obtained, directly
f Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025, 2031 (2008) (plurality opinion). The
federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2006), makes it a federal crime to
knowingly conduct a financial transaction involving the "proceeds" of unlawful activity "with
the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity," or knowing that the
financial transaction is designed "to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds."
2. The term "financial transaction" is defined to mean:
(A) a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce (i)
involving the movement of funds by wire or other means or (ii) involving one or more
monetary instruments, or (iii) involving the transfer of title to any real property,
vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, or (B) a transaction involving the use of a financial
institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce in any way or degree ....
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4).
3. The term "specified unlawful activity" is a term of art under the statute and applies to
more than 250 predicate offenses. Id. § 1956(c)(7); Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2027 (plurality opinion)
(citing MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MONEY
LAUNDERING OFFENDERS, 1994-2001, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/mlo01.pdf).
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or indirectly, through the commission of such criminal activity.4 The
legal implications of the Supreme Court's decision are far reaching
and directly benefit defendants involved in criminal enterprises.
Restricting the money laundering statute to "financial transactions"
involving illicit "profits" derived from specified predicate offenses
imposes significant obstacles to successful prosecution under the
statute. Prosecutors must trace the tainted funds and prove that they
constitute the net profits, not merely the gross receipts, of criminal
activity. To prove net profits, prosecutors will be required to prove
what the defendants' overhead expenses were. For example, the costs
for purchasing, transporting, storing, and distributing illicit drugs
would have to be deducted from the gross receipts. Further, in a
securities fraud case involving insider trading, a defendant could
argue that only the profits of the securities fraud (excluding the funds
used to purchase the securities) would be the subject of a money
laundering charge.
The potential scope of the Supreme Court's holding in Santos also
raises other serious concerns. While the Santos case involved a
prosecution under the "promotion theory" of money laundering, 18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the Court's holding applies to other sub-
sections of the federal money laundering statute that require proof of
"proceeds," including the concealment provision of money
laundering.' Unless the term "proceeds" is interpreted to mean one
thing under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the promotion provision, and something
different under the concealment provision, § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), the
government must prove that the property involved in the financial
transaction constitutes the "net profits" of specified criminal activity.
The Santos decision further restricts the reach of § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), the
international money laundering provision, which criminalizes the
transportation, transmission, or transfer of a monetary instrument or
funds into or out of the United States with knowledge that the
property involved represents the "proceeds" of some form of
unlawful activity, and with the intent to conceal or disguise the
4. Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2029 (plurality opinion).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). This section punishes whoever conducts or attempts to
conduct a financial transaction knowing that the property involved in the transaction represents
the "proceeds" of some form of unlawful activity, which in fact involves the "proceeds" of
specified unlawful activity, knowing that the transaction is designed to conceal or disguise the
nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the "proceeds" of specified unlawful activity.
Under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), proof that the financial transaction involved the "proceeds" of specified
unlawful activity is an essential element of the offense.
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nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the "proceeds" of
specified unlawful activity.6 After Santos, the government must
prove that the monetary instruments or funds involved in the
transportation, transmission, or transfer represent the "net profits" of
specified unlawful activity. Further, the Supreme Court's narrow
construction of the term "proceeds" appears to limit the application of
§ 1957(a), which punishes "[w]hoever... knowingly engages or
attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived
property of a value greater than $10,000."7 After Santos, § 1957 is
seemingly limited to criminalizing only monetary transactions with
illegal profits.
The Supreme Court's ruling also has clear implications for the
application of the federal forfeiture statutes. The criminal and civil
forfeiture statutes authorize the forfeiture of "proceeds."8 If the term
6. Id. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i).
7. Id. § 1957(a). As used in the statute, the term "monetary transaction" means "the
deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of
funds or a monetary instrument ... by, through, or to a financial institution... , including any
transaction that would be a financial transaction under section 1956(c)(4)(B) of this title." Id.
§ 1957(f)(1). For purposes of the statute, the term "criminally derived property" means any
property constituting or derived from "proceeds" obtained from a criminal offense. Id.
§ 1957(f)(2).
8. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1), 982(a)(2), (6)(A)(ii), 1963(a)(3) (2006); 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(a)(1),
(c), 881(a)(6) (2006). The criminal drug forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1), authorizes the
forfeiture of "any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained,
directly or indirectly, as the result of [a felony drug] violation." 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) (emphasis
added). The RICO criminal forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3), provides that whoever
violates any provision of § 1962 shall forfeit to the United States "any property constituting, or
derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering
activity . . . in violation of section 1962." 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (emphasis added). Criminal
forfeiture is also authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 982. Section 982 provides that in imposing
sentence on a person convicted for a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957, or 1960, the court "shall
order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such
offense, or any property traceable to such property." Id. § 982(a)(1) (emphasis added).
However, for other delineated offenses, the court shall order that the person forfeit "any
property constituting, or derived from, proceeds the person obtained directly or indirectly, as
the result of such violation." Id. § 982(a)(2) (emphasis added). Further, with respect to
statutorily enumerated fraud-related offenses, the defendant shall forfeit to the United States
"any property, real or personal, which represents or is traceable to the gross receipts obtained,
directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation." Id. § 982(a)(3) (emphasis added). Moreover,
for persons convicted of altering or removing motor vehicle identification numbers, importing
or exporting stolen motor vehicles, armed robbery of automobiles, transporting stolen motor
vehicles in interstate commerce, or possessing or selling a stolen motor vehicle that has moved
in interstate commerce, § 982(a)(5) authorizes forfeiture of "gross proceeds." Forfeiture of gross
proceeds is also authorized for persons convicted of a federal health care offense or an offense
involving telemarketing. Id. § 982(a)(7)-(8). Finally, § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii) authorizes forfeiture of
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"proceeds" is interpreted consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in Santos, federal prosecutors would have to trace the funds
to net criminal profits, excluding the defendant's overhead expenses
from forfeiture. This would impose a heavy burden on the
government of proving net profits in criminal and civil forfeiture
cases. Finally, since after Santos the money laundering statute only
prohibits the laundering of illicit net profits, financing specified
unlawful activity, including acts of terrorism, with clean money is no
longer criminalized under § 1956(a). For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2339C,
the terrorist financing statute, punishes whoever, directly or
indirectly, "unlawfully and willfully provides or collects funds" with
the intention or with the knowledge that such funds are to be used to
commit enumerated acts of terrorism.9 However, the terrorist funds
can be derived from either an illegal or a lawful source. Under the
Supreme Court's narrow definition of "proceeds," conducting a
financial transaction with the proceeds of terrorist financing derived
from a legitimate source is not prohibited by the money laundering
statute.
At a minimum, the Santos decision (1) imposes an unreasonable
burden on prosecutors to prove net profits (money acquired less
defendant's overhead expenses), (2) restricts other provisions of the
money laundering statute and generates confusion with respect to
whether the Court's restrictive construction of the term "proceeds"
applies to the federal forfeiture statutes, and (3) limits the application
of the money laundering statute to predicate acts that generate illicit
profits, rendering null and void terrorist financing and other
predicate offenses involving financial transactions with funds derived
from a lawful source.'0 To remedy the deleterious effects of the
mere "proceeds" derived from or traceable to a violation of enumerated provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.
Civil forfeiture of "all proceeds" traceable to a federal drug crime is authorized under
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1) authorizes forfeiture of "any proceeds,"
"gross receipts," or "gross proceeds" based on the specific underlying offense giving rise to
forfeiture.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a) (2006). The term "specified unlawful activity" includes violations
of 18 U.S.C. § 2339C, which prohibits the willful provision or collection of funds to finance acts
of terrorism. Id. § 1956(c)(7)(D).
10. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-2339B (2006) (prohibiting the provision of material support to
terrorists and foreign terrorist organizations), invalidated in part by Humanitarian Law Project
v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the terms "training," "service,"
and "expert advise or assistance" based on "other specialized knowledge" were void for
vagueness); 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (punishing the financing of terrorism). However, these statutes
punish the provision of financial support to terrorists and foreign terrorist organizations
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Santos decision, Congress should amend the federal money
laundering statute to make it a crime to engage in a financial
transaction involving any funds derived, directly or indirectly, from
specified unlawful activity, and not limited to the net gain or profits
realized from such criminal acts.
Part I of this Article discusses the Supreme Court's decision in
Santos, including the unusual alignment of Justices comprising the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part II provides an
overview of the legislative history and structure of the federal money
laundering statute. Part III examines the legal implications of the
Santos decision on other sections of the federal money laundering
statute. Part IV further discusses the legal effect of the Supreme
Court's ruling on the federal forfeiture statutes that authorize the
forfeiture of "proceeds." Specifically, following Santos, is the criminal
and civil forfeiture of "proceeds" limited to the net profits of criminal
activity? Are the defendant's criminal overhead expenses exempt
from forfeiture? Part V analyzes Justice Scalia's erroneous
construction of § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), and rejects his overly broad
application of the promotion theory of money laundering. Part VI
discusses how the Santos decision excludes from the money
laundering statute predicate offenses that do not generate illicit
profits, such as the terrorist financing statute. Finally, this Article
concludes by proposing several amendments to strengthen and
enhance the effectiveness of the federal money laundering statute.
I. THE SANTOS DECISION
Respondent Elfrain Santos was charged with operating an illegal
lottery in Indiana for over two decades." According to the
government, Santos, the ring-leader of the gambling enterprise,
employed various helpers to run the lottery.' 2 These helpers gathered
bets from gamblers, kept a portion of the bets as their commissions,
and delivered the balance to Santos's collectors. 3 One of the
collectors was respondent Benedicto Diaz, who delivered the money
to Santos.14 The money received by Santos was used to pay the
regardless of whether the funds were derived from an unlawful or lawful source. See id. §§
2339A-2339C.
11. United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020,2022-23 (2008) (plurality opinion).
12. Id. at 2022.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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salaries of his collectors, including Diaz, and to pay off the winners.15
After a jury trial, Santos was found guilty of conspiracy to run an
illegal gambling business (18 U.S.C. § 371), running an illegal
gambling business (18 U.S.C. § 1955), conspiracy to launder money
(18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and § 1956(h)), and money laundering (18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)). 16 Santos was sentenced to sixty months of
imprisonment on the gambling counts and to 210 months of
incarceration on the money laundering counts.1 7 Diaz pleaded guilty
to conspiracy to launder money and was sentenced to 108 months of
imprisonment.1 8 The convictions were affirmed on appeal.' 9 There-
after, the Seventh Circuit decided United States v. Scialabba, another
gambling case involving video poker machines, which held that the
money laundering statute's use of "proceeds" meant net profits, not
20gross receipts.
Respondents filed motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, collaterally
attacking their convictions and sentences. 2' Applying the holding in
Scialabba, the district court vacated the money laundering
convictions, finding no evidence that the financial transactions on
which the money laundering convictions were based involved net
profits, as opposed to gross receipts, of the illegal gambling
business.22 The court of appeals affirmed.23
Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by Justices Souter and
Ginsburg, and Thomas in part, affirmed the Seventh Circuit's
dismissal of the money laundering counts, holding that the term
"proceeds" in the federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1), means illicit "profits," not "gross receipts." 24  Justice
Stevens provided the necessary fifth vote, concurring in the
judgment.25
15. Id. at 2022-23.
16. Id. at 2023.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.; United States v. Scialabba, 282 F.3d 475, 475,478 (7th Cir. 2002).
21. Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2023 (plurality opinion).
22. Id.; see also Santos v. United States, 461 F.3d 886, 888-89 (7th Cir. 2006), aff'd, 128 S.
Ct. 2020 (2008).
23. Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2023 (plurality opinion); see also Santos, 461 F.3d at 894.
24. Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2023, 2031 (plurality opinion). Justice Thomas joined all but Part IV
of Justice Scalia's opinion. Id. at 2022.
25. Id. at 2031 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Justice Scalia advanced two principal arguments in support of the
Court's holding that the term "proceeds" means "net profits" for
purposes of the federal money laundering statute. First, Justice Scalia
reviewed the "ordinary meaning" of the term from the dictionary and
concluded that "proceeds" can mean either profits or gross receipts.
26
Recognizing the word's inherent "ambiguity" in the money
laundering statute, Justice Scalia concluded that the "tie must go to
the defendant" under the rule of lenity.27 Pursuant to the rule of
lenity, ambiguous criminal laws must be interpreted in favor of the
defendant.28 Second, Justice Scalia argued that if "proceeds" meant
"receipts," "nearly every violation of the illegal-lottery statute would
also be a violation of the money-laundering statute, because paying a
winning bettor is a transaction involving receipts that the defendant
intends to promote the carrying on of the lottery."29 According to
Justice Scalia, every payment of gambling winnings with lottery
money would violate both the illegal gambling and the money
laundering statutes, creating a "merger" problem. 0 Justice Scalia
explained: "Since few lotteries, if any, will not pay their winners, the
statute criminalizing illegal lotteries, 18 U.S.C. § 1955, would 'merge'
with the money-laundering statute. ' '3 1 As a result of this merger,
lottery operators ordinarily facing five years of imprisonment for
running an illegal gambling business would be subject instead to
twenty years of imprisonment for violating the federal money
laundering statute.32 It would be unfair to impose the heavier money
laundering penalty for transactions that normally occur during the
course of running an illegal lottery and warrant a lighter penalty,
according to Justice Scalia. 3
Justice Scalia further argued that the "merger problem" is not
limited to lottery operators, but extends to a host of other predicate
crimes. Advancing an expansionist view of the promotion theory of
money laundering, Justice Scalia declared:
26. Id. at 2024 (plurality opinion).
27. Id. at 2025.
28. Id. at 2025-26.
29. Id. at 2026.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 2027.
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Anyone who pays for the costs of a crime with its proceeds-for
example, the felon who uses the stolen money to pay for the rented
getaway car-would violate the money-laundering statute. And any
wealth-acquiring crime with multiple participants would become
money-laundering when the initial recipient of the wealth gives his
confederates their shares.
34
In sum, a financial transaction with proceeds of specified unlawful
activity that facilitates, directly or indirectly, such unlawful activity,
would constitute money laundering under the promotion theory, 18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), and "any specified unlawful activity, an
episode of which includes transactions which are not elements of the
offense and in which a participant passes receipts on to someone else,
would merge with money laundering. " 35  For Justice Scalia, the
answer to the merger problem is to restrict the statutory term
"proceeds" to mean illicit "profits." Thus, for example, the money
laundering statute would not apply to "[a] criminal who enters into a
transaction paying the expenses of his illegal activity. . . , because
by definition profits consist of what remains after expenses are
paid.'3 6 Further, defraying the costs of criminal activity with its
receipts would not be covered.37
Justice Stevens filed a separate opinion, concurring in the
judgment.38 Justice Stevens observed that the term "proceeds" in the
money laundering statute applies to a varied and lengthy list of
enumerated crimes, including, inter alia, drug offenses, murder,
bribery, fraud, terrorist financing, environmental offenses, and health
care offenses.3 9 He stated that "Congress could have provided that
the term 'proceeds' shall have one meaning when referring to some
specified unlawful activities and a different meaning when referring
to others," but failed to do so.4° While the legislative history of § 1956
makes it clear that "Congress intended the term 'proceeds' to include
gross revenues from the sale of contraband and the operation of
organized crime syndicates involving such sales," Justice Stevens
posited that the congressional history sheds no light on how to
34. Id. at 2026-27.
35. Id. at 2027.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2031 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
39. Id.
40. Id.
[Vol. 7:2
Spring 2009] DOES "PROCEEDS" MEAN "NETPROFITS"? 347
identify the "proceeds" of many other types of specified unlawful
activities, including the operation of an illegal gambling business. 1
While recognizing that the term "proceeds" could be construed to
mean either the "gross receipts" or "profits" derived from an illegal
gambling operation, Justice Stevens adopted the more restrictive
construction of the term.42 He opined that to interpret the "proceeds"
of a gambling business to include gross receipts would permit the
government to treat the mere payment of the expenses of an illegal
gambling business as money laundering.43 Such a result would be
unfair because the penalties for money laundering are substantially
more severe than those for operating an illegal gambling
business.44 "Faced with both a lack of legislative history speaking to
the definition of 'proceeds' when operating a gambling business is the
'specified unlawful activity"' and his conviction that Congress could
not have intended the mere payment of expenses incurred in
operating a gambling enterprise to support a money laundering
conviction and substantially increase the defendant's criminal
sentence, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Scalia that the rule of
lenity must apply.
4
Justice Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, which focused on
two points.46 First, he maintained that the way to avoid the merger
problem is not by restricting the meaning of "proceeds," but by
narrowing the application of the promotion provision. Justice
Breyer posited that the money laundering offense must be separate
and distinct from and follow in time the underlying crime that
generated the money to be laundered. 4' He further suggested that the
statutory requirement that the financial transaction be conducted
"with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity" is not satisfied where, for example, "only one instance of that
underlying activity is at issue., 49 In other words, a person cannot
promote "the carrying on" of completed, as opposed to ongoing,
41. Id. at 2032.
42. Id
43. Id. at 2033.
44. Seeid.
45. Id. at 2033-34.
46. Id. at 2034-35 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2035 (citing United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1214 (10th Cir. 1991)).
49. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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criminal activity. °  Second, Justice Breyer proposed that any
unfairness in sentencing could be addressed by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, which has been vested with the authority to "avoi[d]
unwarranted sentencing disparities among those found guilty of
similar criminal conduct."5' Justice Breyer stated that the money
laundering guideline "by making no exception for a situation where
nothing but a single instance of the underlying crime has taken place,
would seem to create a serious and unwarranted disparity among
defendants who have engaged in identical conduct."52 Justice Breyer
was cautiously hopeful that the U.S. Sentencing Commission's past
efforts to tie more closely the offense level for money laundering to
the offense level of the underlying crime could prevent any disparity
in sentencing.53
Justice Alito, with whom Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
Kennedy and Breyer joined, authored a strong dissenting opinion,
raising multiple arguments.54 Justice Alito stated that concluding that
"proceeds" means "profits" would "frustrate Congress'[s] intent and
maim a statute that was enacted as an important defense against
organized criminal enterprises."" He criticized Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion, stating:
Ignoring the context in which the term is used, the problems that the
money laundering statute was enacted to address, and the obvious
practical considerations that those responsible for drafting the
statute almost certainly had in mind, that opinion is quick to
pronounce the term hopelessly ambiguous and thus to invoke the
rule of lenity.
6
Justice Alito argued that when a word has more than one
meaning, as the term "proceeds" obviously does, the Court should
consider what the term customarily means in the context in which it is
used, rather than abandon any effort at interpretation and rush to
apply the rule of lenity.57 He found the United Nations Convention
50. See id.
51. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(b)(1)(B) (2006)).
52. Id. (emphasis omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2036.
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Against Transnational Organized Crime, the leading treaty on
international money laundering, which has been adopted by the
United States and 146 other countries, instructive on the meaning of
the term "proceeds" in the context of money laundering. 8 Article 6.1
of the Convention imposes an obligation on State Parties to enact
domestic legislation to criminalize "[t]he ... transfer of property,
knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose
of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of
helping any person who is involved in the commission of the
predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her
action." 9 The Convention defines the term "proceeds" to mean "any
property derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the
commission of an offence." 60 Thus, the Convention does not limit the
term "proceeds" to illicit profits, but covers gross receipts. 61 Moreover,
Justice Alito argued that if the federal money laundering statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), were limited to illicit profits, the United States
would not be in compliance with its treaty obligations, because the
Convention requires State Parties to criminalize the laundering of any
property derived from a criminal offense, not merely illicit profits.
Next, Justice Alito observed that the term "proceeds" is given
broad scope in the Model Money Laundering Act, and that fourteen
states have money laundering statutes that define the term
"proceeds" to encompass gross receipts. 63  He concluded that this
"pattern of usage ... strongly suggests that when lawmakers,
knowledgeable about the nature and problem of money laundering,
use the term 'proceeds' in a money laundering provision, they
customarily mean for the term to reach all receipts and not just
profits. 64
58. Id.; see also United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov.
15, 2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-16 (2004), 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 [hereinafter Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime].
59. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 58, S. TREATY DOC.
108-16, at 4-5, 2225 U.N.T.S. at 277 (emphasis added).
60. Id. S. TREATY Doc. 108-16, at 2, 2225 U.N.T.S. at 275.
61. Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2036 (Alito, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 2036 n.3; Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 58, S.
TREATY DOc. 108-16, at 2, 4-5, 2225 U.N.T.S. at 275, 277.
63. Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2037 (Alito, J., dissenting); Model Money Laundering Act § 4(a), in
THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MODEL STATE DRUG LAWS: ECONOMIC
REMEDIES, at C-112 (1993).
64. Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2037 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Justice Alito further posited that restricting "proceeds" to mean
"profits" would make it more difficult to obtain a conviction under
the federal money laundering statute. He cited as support for his
argument § 1956(c), which explicitly provides that a money launderer
need only know that "'the property involved in the transaction
represented the proceeds of some form, though not necessarily which
form, of [specified illegal] activity."' 65  Under § 1956(c), the
prosecution is not required to prove that the money launderer knew
that the illegal proceeds were derived from a specific crime, such as
drug trafficking or fraud. If Congress, pursuant to § 1956(c), did not
intend to impose a burden on prosecutors to prove that the defendant
acted with knowledge that the tainted money was derived from a
particular crime, Justice Alito maintained that Congress did not
intend to require prosecutors to prove that the money launderer acted
with knowledge that the funds provided for laundering were illicit
profits, not gross receipts.66
Furthermore, tracing funds back to particular criminal activity
and proving the profitability of these sales may often prove
impossible, according to Justice Alito.67 Proving net income would
require the government to prove "[tihe excess of revenues over all
related expenses for a given period." 68 In drug-money laundering
cases, for example, the courts would have to decide whether the drug
enterprise's net income should be calculated annually, quarterly, or
on some other basis.69 Rules would need to be established in order to
determine whether particular illegal expenses should be excluded
from net profits.70 The problem is further compounded by the fact
that illegal enterprises do not keep books and records detailing their
65. Id. at 2039 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1) (2006)).
66. See id. Justice Scalia rather cavalierly diminished the burden imposed on prosecutors
to trace the funds to net profits. See id. at 2029 (plurality opinion). This view stands in stark
contrast to federal court decisions holding that the government need not trace the proceeds to a
particular instance of fraud or criminal activity. In United States v. Ward, the Eleventh Circuit
stated: "Congress did not intend for participants in unlawful activities to escape conviction for
money laundering 'simply by commingling funds derived from both "specified unlawful
activities" and other activities."' 197 F.3d 1076, 1083 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v.
Cancelliere, 69 F.3d 1116, 1120 (11th Cir. 1995)). While Ward was concerned with tracing
criminal proceeds commingled with funds derived from lawful activities, tracing funds to
exclude overhead expenses from illicit net profits also presents an enormous problem for
prosecutors. See id. at 1078.
67. Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2040 (Alito, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (citing RALPH W. ESTES, DICTIONARY OF ACCOUNTING 88 (1981)).
69. Id. at 2041.
70. Seeid.at2040-41.
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criminal expenditures. Thus, in a complex case, occurring over a
substantial period of time involving multiple financial transactions, it
may be difficult to prove whether individual transactions represented
illicit profits, or payment for crime-related expenses. In sum,
adopting a restrictive construction of "proceeds" creates a myriad of
proof problems, which Justice Alito maintained serve no discernible
purpose.
II. THE MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL ACT OF 1986: ITS
STRUCTURE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Given the fractured approach of the Court in interpreting
"proceeds," it is fitting to examine the statute itself and its legislative
history. The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 ("MLCA")
makes it a federal crime to launder the "proceeds" from "specified
unlawful activity. "7 1  In enacting the MLCA, Congress had two
purposes in mind. First, it was Congress's intent to criminalize the
"process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal
application of income, and then disguises that income to make it
appear legitimate." 72  Second, the MLCA aimed to stem the flow of
illicit funds back to the criminal enterprise for the purpose of
capitalizing and expanding unlawful activity.73 Congress was keenly
aware that the lucrative profits generated by organized crime and
international drug cartels had created, out of necessity, the
71. Money Laundering Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-18 to
-21 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (2006)). "Specified unlawful activity" is a term of art
under the federal money laundering statute and applies to more than 250 predicate offenses. 18
U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7); Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2027 (plurality opinion) (citing MOTIVANS, supra note 3).
72. Cf PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,
AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT].
73. See JIMMY GURULt, COMPLEX CRIMINAL LITIGATION: PROSECUTING DRUG ENTERPRISES
AND ORGANIZED CRIME 120 (2d ed. 2000). Senator Alphonse D'Amato, a chief sponsor of the
Senate bill, stated that "[mioney laundering permits drug traffickers ... to buy more drugs for
resale, and to acquire the planes, boats, and front corporations they use to smuggle drugs into
the United States." Drug Money Laundering: Hearing on S. 571 Before the S Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 7 (1985) (statement of Sen. Alphonse
D'Amato, Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs). Senator Dennis
DeConcini remarked that "[w]ithout the means to launder money, thereby making cash
generated by a criminal enterprise appear to come from a legitimate source, organized crime
could not flourish as it now does." Money Laundering Legislation: Hearing on S 527, S. 1335,
and S. 1385 Before the S. Comm. on theJudiciary, 99th Cong. 30 (1985) (statement of Sen. Dennis
DeConcini, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
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professional money launderer.7 4 Congress was particularly concerned
with "the increasing number of professionals, such as lawyers,
accountants, and bankers, willing to look the other way or become
active participants in the laundering of illicit monies. 75  One of
the sponsors of the House bill, declared: "'I am sick and tired of
watching people sit back and say, 'I am not part of the problem, I am
not committing the crime, and, therefore, my hands are clean even
though I know the money is dirty I am handling." 76 In short, the
MLCA was intended to put a stop to the activities of both "those who
make and [ ... ] those who take dirty money. 77
The MLCA makes it a crime to knowingly engage in a financial
transaction with the "proceeds" of some form of unlawful activity
either with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), or with the intent of concealing or
disguising the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of
proceeds derived from specified criminal activity, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). 78  Subsections 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i) are
74. See GURULt, supra note 73, at 121.
75. Id. at 121 n.7. Senator Sasser commented, "[I1t's no secret that for some banks, paying
the $10,000 fine [for failure to file a suspicious transaction report under the Bank Secrecy Act] or
the risk of paying it is really a small price to pay for the large cash deposits that may find their
way into the vaults of these particular banks." The Drug Money Seizure Act and the Bank
Secrecy Act Amendments: Hearing on S. 571 and S. 2306 Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 17 (1986) (statement of Sen. Jim Sasser, Member, S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs).
76. GURULt, supra note 73, at 121 (quoting The Markup by The Subcommittee on Crime of
H.R. 99-5077, at 22-23 (1986)).
77. Id. (quoting Emily J. Lawrence, Note, Let the Seller Beware: Money Laundering,
Merchants and 18 U.S.C §§ 1956, 1957 33 B.C. L. REV. 841, 849 (1992)).
78. Section 1956(a)(1) provides in relevant part:
Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a
financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity-
(A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) with the intent to . . . [violate] section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986; or
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part-
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the
control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement...
shall be sentenced to a fine... or imprisonment ... , or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2006).
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aimed at criminalizing different activities. Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the
"promotion" provision, is aimed at the practice of "plowing back
proceeds of 'specified unlawful activity' to promote" the carrying on
of such activity.7 9 In contrast, § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), the "concealment"
theory, makes it a crime to conceal or disguise the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity.80  Section 1956(h) further punishes
whoever conspires to commit a money laundering offense.8'
To obtain a conviction under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the government
must prove the following elements: (1) the defendant conducted or
attempted to conduct a "financial transaction," (2) which the
defendant knew involved the "proceeds" of some form of unlawful
activity, (3) which in fact involved the "proceeds" of "specified
unlawful activity," (4) with the intent to "promote the carrying on"
of "specified unlawful activity., 82 To sustain a violation of
§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), the government must prove that the defendant (1)
knowingly conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction,
(2) with the "proceeds" of some form of unlawful activity, (3) which
in fact involved the "proceeds" of specified unlawful activity, (4)
knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to
conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership,
or the control of the "proceeds" of specified unlawful activity.
83
To sustain a conviction under either § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) or
(a)(1)(B)(i), the government must prove that the defendant engaged in
a "financial transaction" with criminal proceeds. The term "financial
transaction" means-
(A) a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or
foreign commerce (i) involving the movement of funds by wire or
other means or (ii) involving one or more monetary instruments, or
79. United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991); see also United States v.
Miller, 22 F.3d 1075, 1080 (11th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing money laundering theories under
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i)).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); Jackson, 935 F.2d at 842.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Section 1956(h) provides: "Any person who conspires to commit
any offense defined in this section or section 1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those
prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy."
82. Id. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i); see United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 679-80 (2d Cir.
1994); United States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929, 937 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Brown, 944
F.2d 1377, 1387 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991).
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1473
(10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Baker, 985 F.2d 1248, 1252 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 766 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Levine, 970 F.2d 681, 686 (10th Cir.
1992).
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(iii) involving the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel,
or aircraft, or (B) a transaction involving the use of a financial
institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree .... 84
The term "transaction" is broadly defined in § 1956(c)(3) to
include the "purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or
other disposition." 85 With respect to a "financial institution," the term
"transaction" includes a "deposit, withdrawal, transfer between
accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or
sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary
instrument, use of a safe deposit box, or any other payment, transfer,
or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution.
" 86
"Specified unlawful activity" is a legal term of art under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a). 87 The term is similar by analogy to the term "racketeering
activity" in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a), which is an essential element of a
RICO violation.88 Both "racketeering activity" and "specified unlawful
activity" encompass numerous predicate crimes. In fact, there are
more than 250 predicate offenses covered by the money laundering
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4); see United States v. Reed, 77 F.3d 139, 142 (6th Cir. 1996)
(discussing the statutory construction of the terms "transaction" and "financial transaction");
United States v. Turner, 975 F.2d 490, 497 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming a money laundering
conviction where evidence showed that defendant was a drug dealer and made over $600,000 in
payments on a building and its renovation in cash); Jackson, 935 F.2d at 841 (holding that
writing a check, whether for cash or to a vendor for services provided, falls within the definition
of "financial transaction," because the bank from which the money was drawn was a financial
institution affecting interstate commerce); United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1256-57
(8th Cir. 1990) (finding that the transfer of title of defendant's pickup truck constituted a
"financial transaction").
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3). The term "transaction" has been broadly construed by the
courts. See, e.g., United States v. France, 164 F.3d 203, 208 (4th Cir. 1998) ("The posting of bond
constitutes a sufficient financial transaction for money laundering purposes."); United States v.
Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1101 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that surrendering a check to an undercover
federal agent in exchange for cash constituted a "transaction" within the meaning of the money
laundering statute); United States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Subsection
1956(c)(3) defines 'transaction' to include 'delivery' of the illegal proceeds.").
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3).
87. Id. § 1956(c)(7).
88. See id. § 1961(a). To establish a violation of RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), the
government must prove, among other things, that the defendant participated in a "pattern of
racketeering activity or [in the] collection of an unlawful debt." See id. § 1962(a) (emphasis
added). The term "racketeering activity" is defined to include murder, kidnapping, gambling,
arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, drug dealing, and dozens of federal crimes. Id. § 1961(1); see
also GuRuLt, supra note 73, at 61 (discussing the prohibited conduct under RICO).
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statute.89  For example, § 1956(c)(7) defines the term "specified
unlawful activity" to include any act that would constitute
"racketeering activity" under the RICO statute,90 bank fraud, 9'
bankruptcy fraud,92 mail fraud,93 conducting an illegal gambling
business and interstate transmission of wagering information, 94 a
violation of the Hobbs Act,95  narcotics trafficking,96 as well as
numerous other felony offenses.
III. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SANTOS DECISION
A. The Concealment Theory
In the Santos case the defendant was charged under the
promotion theory of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). 97
However, the Court's holding that "proceeds" means "net profits" is
not limited to prosecutions under the promotion theory, but has legal
implications for other subsections of the federal money laundering
statute. Proof that the defendant knowingly engaged in a financial
transaction with the "proceeds" of specified criminal activity is also
an essential element for conviction under the concealment theory of
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7); United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2027 (plurality opinion)
(citing MOTIVANS, supra note 3).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A); e.g., United States v. Hare, 49 F.3d 447, 451-52 (8th Cir. 1995);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (racketeering offenses).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A); e.g., United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 676 n.4, 679 (2d
Cir. 1994); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (financial institution fraud offenses).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D); e.g., United States v. Ward, 197 F.3d 1076, 1082 (11th Cir.
1999).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A); e.g., United States v. Habhab, 132 F.3d 410, 414 (8th Cir. 1997);
Hare, 49 F.3d at 451-52 (finding that because § 1956(c)(7)(A) defines "specified unlawful
activity" as "any act or activity constituting an offense listed in section 1961(1) [('racketeering
activity' under the RICO statute)]," and wire fraud is specifically listed in § 1961(1)(B), wire
fraud is therefore a predicate offense within the meaning of the money laundering statute); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (wire fraud offenses).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A); e.g., United States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir.
1995); United States v. Miller, 22 F.3d 1075, 1077 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. LeBlanc, 24
F.3d 340, 346 (1st Cir. 1994); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (illegal gambling business and
transmission of gambling information offenses).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A); e.g., United States v. Carcione, 272 F.3d 1297, 1303 (11th Cir.
2001); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (Hobbs Act offenses).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(C); see also United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1206 (3d Cir.
1994); United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 1991).
97. United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2023 (2008) (plurality opinion).
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money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). 98 A defendant is guilty
of money laundering under the concealment theory if he conducted or
attempted to conduct a financial transaction which he knew involved
the "proceeds" of some form of unlawful activity, which in fact
involved the "proceeds" of specified unlawful activity, knowing that
the transaction was designed to conceal or disguise the nature,
location, source, ownership, or the control of the "proceeds" of
specified unlawful activity. 99 After the Supreme Court's ruling
in Santos, in order to sustain a conviction under the concealment
theory, the government must prove that the defendant engaged in a
financial transaction with knowledge that the property involved in
such transaction represents the "net profits" of some form of criminal
activity and the funds actually involved the "net profits" of specified
unlawful activity.' 
00
The Santos Court's restrictive reading of "proceeds" to mean "net
profits" will make it more difficult for prosecutors to convict under
the concealment theory of money laundering.'0 ' Not only must the
government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the funds involved
in the financial transaction constituted "net profits," meaning the
excess of returns over expenditures in the criminal enterprise, but it
must also prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that the
funds involved in the transaction represented the "net profits" of
criminal activity. Determining "net profits" raises numerous troubling
issues. For example, how are "net profits" to be measured? What if
the overall operations of the criminal enterprise are profitable, but the
particular transaction at issue involved a net loss? In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Alito raised the following scenario:
Suppose... that a drug cartel sends a large shipment of drugs to this
country, a good part of the shipment is intercepted, the remainder is
sold, the cartel ends up with a net loss but with a large quantity of
cash on its hands, and the cartel uses the cash in financial
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); see also GURULU, supra note 73, at 124-25 (discussing
the concealment theory).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
100. See Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2025 (plurality opinion). The reasoning of the plurality opinion
in Santos, including the Court's reliance on the rule of lenity, appears to apply with equal force
when construing the term "proceeds" as used in § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Furthermore, there is no
reason to suggest that the term "proceeds" should be construed to mean "profits" for purposes
of § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), but interpreted to mean something different under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
101. See Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2039 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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transactions that are designed to conceal the source of the cash or to
promote further crime.1
02
Under the ruling of the majority of the Justices on the Court, the
evidence arguably would not support a conviction for money
laundering because the dirty money involved in the financial
transactions did not represent the "net profits" of specified unlawful
activity (drug trafficking). Yet, as Justice Alito correctly stated,
"[tlhere is no plausible reason why Congress would not have wanted
the money laundering statute to apply to these financial
transactions.' ' 0 3 Justice Alito further explained: "If the cartel leaders
use the money to live in luxury, this provides an incentive for these
individuals to stay in the business and for others to enter. If the cartel
uses the money to finance future drug shipments or to expand the
business, public safety is harmed."
10 4
It makes no sense to punish money launderers who participate in
financial transactions with dirty money, intending to conceal the
funds from law enforcement, but exempt those same individuals from
prosecution if the property involved in the transactions was derived
from criminal activity, but did not involve the net profits of such
illegal conduct. In both cases, the money launderer acted with a
guilty mind, intending to disguise the nature, source, ownership, or
control of funds derived from criminal activity.
It should further be emphasized that the principle reason
articulated by the Supreme Court for restricting the reach of the
money laundering statute to "net profits" has no application to the
concealment provision. In his plurality opinion, Justice Scalia argued
that narrowing the term "proceeds" to mean "net proceeds" is
necessary to avoid the so-called merger problem.0 5 However, the
merger problem has no application under the concealment theory of
money laundering. There is no concern that the evidence used to
convict for the underlying predicate offense would also prove a
violation of the money laundering statute under the concealment
theory. For example, evidence that Santos took money derived from
his gambling business and paid winning bettors would not establish
money laundering under the concealment theory. The elements of
proof required to sustain a conviction for operating an illegal
102. Id. at 2038.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2026-27 (plurality opinion).
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gambling business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a), and violating
the money laundering statute under the concealment theory, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), are completely different. The illegal gambling
statute punishes "[w]hoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises,
directs, or owns.., an illegal gambling business." 106 The money laun-
dering statute, on the other hand, requires proof that the defendant
conducted a financial transaction knowing that the funds involved
some form of criminal activity, the funds actually involved the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity, and the transaction was
conducted with the intent to conceal or disguise the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity.'0 7  Simply stated, Santos's guilt for
financing, managing, supervising, or directing an illegal gambling
business would not automatically establish a violation of the federal
money laundering statute under the concealment theory. The same
holds true for other predicate crimes. For example, evidence that the
defendant trafficked in illegal drugs or participated in other wealth-
acquiring crimes would not automatically prove money laundering
under a theory of concealment. Those crimes do not require proof
that the defendant conducted a financial transaction with the intent to
conceal the proceeds of criminal activity. '0 Thus, while Justice
Scalia's merger argument may have application in certain cases
prosecuted under the promotion theory, this reasoning offers no
justification whatsoever for restricting the application of the money
laundering statute and imposing unnecessary problems of proof for
prosecutors under the concealment theory.
B. The International Money Laundering Provision
The Santos decision further implicates § 1956(a)(2), the
international federal money laundering statute, under a theory of
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (2006).
107. Id. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
108. For example, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), the federal drug statute, makes it unlawful for
any person to knowingly or intentionally "manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with
the intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." Proof that the
defendant engaged in a financial transaction with the proceeds of specified unlawful activity
with the intent to conceal or disguise such proceeds is irrelevant to whether the defendant is
guilty of violating § 841(a)(1). The elements required to prove a federal drug offense are entirely
different from those elements required to prove a money laundering violation under the
concealment theory. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
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concealment.'0 9 Section 1956(a)(2) criminalizes the transportation,
transmission, or transfer of a monetary instrument or funds into or
out of the United States with the intent to promote the carrying on of
specified unlawful activity, or for the purpose of concealing or
disguising the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity." °  At first glance, the
international money laundering provision, § 1956(a)(2)(A), appears
similar to its domestic counterpart, § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). However, while
both the domestic and international money laundering statutes
require proof that the defendant acted with the intent to promote the
carrying on of specified unlawful activity, the statutes are dissimilar
in several important respects."' "First, § 1956(a)(2)(A) does not
require proof that the defendant conducted a 'financial transaction.'
Second, there is no requirement under § 1956(a)(2)(A) that the
monetary instruments or funds transported, transmitted, or
transferred internationally represent the proceeds of criminal
activity. ' 12  Unlike § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), § 1956(a)(2)(A) punishes the
mere transportation, transmission, or transfer of funds, obtained from
an unlawful or lawful source, if done with the requisite intent.'
13
Stated another way, the international money laundering statute
punishes the transportation, transmission, or transfer of either dirty or
clean money intended to promote the carrying on of specified
unlawful activity. Because proof that the transportation, trans-
mission, or transfer involved "proceeds" of specified unlawful
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i); see also Cuellar v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1994, 1998,
2006 (2008) (holding that § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) requires more than evidence that the defendant hid
cash during its transportation out of the country; prosecutors must prove that the purpose of the
transportation of the cash was to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of
the funds).
The subsequent discussion of the international money laundering statute is taken, in
part, from GURULt, supra note 73, at 156-57.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A)-(B)(i). Under the statute, the term "monetary instrument"
means "(i) coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks,
personal checks, bank checks, and money orders, or (ii) investment securities or negotiable
instruments, in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery."
Id. § 1956(c)(5).
111. GURULI, supra note 73, at 157.
112. Id.; see also United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 680 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[Section]
1956(a)(2) contains no requirement that the 'proceeds' first be generated by unlawful activity,
followed by a financial transaction with those proceeds, for criminal liability to attach."); United
States v. Hamilton, 931 F.2d 1046, 1052 (5th Cir. 1991) (same holding).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(2)(A); GuRuLt, supra note 73, at 157.
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activity is not an element of the offense, the Santos decision has no
application and does not limit the reach of § 1956(a)(2)(A).
The international money laundering provision, however, also
contains a concealment provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), which
requires proof of proceeds. The Santos decision directly impacts this
subsection of the statute. Section 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) punishes
[w]hoever transports, transmits, or transfers... a monetary instrument
or funds from a place in the United States to or through a place
outside the United States or to a place in the United States from or
through a place outside the United States-
(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the
transportation, transmission, or transfer represent the proceeds
of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that such
transportation, transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or
in part-
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity ....114
Under the concealment theory, proof that the transportation,
transmission, or transfer of the monetary instrument or funds
involved the "proceeds" of specified unlawful activity is an essential
element of the offense.1'5 Because Santos holds that "proceeds"
means "net profits," the government arguably must prove that the
defendant participated in such conduct knowing that the monetary
instrument or funds represented the "net profits" of some form of
criminal activity." 6  The prosecution must further prove that the
monetary instrument or funds transported, transmitted, or transferred
in fact involved the "net profits" of specified unlawful activity."'
In this context, the merger argument Justice Scalia relied on in
restricting the reach of the money laundering statute has no
application. Proof of the criminal activity that generated the property
involved in the international transportation, transmission, or transfer
of a monetary instrument or funds does not automatically prove a
114. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116. See United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008) (plurality opinion).
117. See id.
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violation of § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Merging the underlying predicate
crime with the money laundering offense is therefore not required.
Moreover, the defendant is not subjected to harsher punishment
under the money laundering statute for merely engaging in conduct
required to convict for the predicate offense.
C. Engaging in Monetary Transactions Greater than $10,000
The Santos decision also has legal implications for proving
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. Section 1957 makes it a crime to
knowingly engage or attempt to engage in a "monetary transaction"
in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000,
involving funds derived from specified unlawful activity.1 8  To
obtain a conviction under § 1957(a), the government must prove five
elements: "(1) the defendant engage[d] or attempt[ed] to engage (2) in
a monetary transaction (3) in criminally derived property that is of a
value greater than $10,000 (4) knowing that the property is derived
from unlawful activity, and (5) the property is, in fact, derived from
'specified unlawful activity."' 9  The statute defines "monetary
transaction" to mean "the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange,
in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary
instrument.., by, through, or to a financial institution." 20 The term
"criminally derived property" means "any property constituting, or
derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense,'
2 1
Section 1957(a) criminalizes any bank transaction with proceeds in
excess of $10,000 derived from specified unlawful activity. In United
States v. Rutgard, the Ninth Circuit declared:
[Section 1957(a)] is a powerful tool because it makes any dealing
with a bank potentially a trap for the drug dealer or any other
defendant who has a hoard of criminal cash derived from the
specified crimes. If he makes a "deposit, withdrawal, transfer[,] or
exchange" with this cash, he commits the crime; he's forced to
commit another felony if he wants to use a bank.... As long as the
underlying crime has been completed and the defendant "possesses"
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (2006).
119. United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 408 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v.
Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 567 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270,
1291 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing the application of § 1957).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1).
121. Id. § 1957(0(2) (emphasis added).
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the funds at the time of deposit, the proceeds cannot enter the
banking system without a new crime being committed.
122
Section 1957(a) is distinguishable from § 1956(a) because it does not
require proof that the transaction was conducted with the specific
intent to conceal illicit proceeds or promote the carrying on of
specified unlawful activity. The statute eliminates the specific intent
requirement of § 1956(a). The differences between § 1957(a) and
§ 1956(a) have been described as follows:
The description of the crime [in § 1957(a)] does not speak to the
attempt to cleanse dirty money by putting it in a clean form and so
disguising it. This statute applies to the most open, above-board
transaction. The intent to commit a crime or the design of concealing
criminal fruits is eliminated. These differences make [a] violation of
§ 1957 easier to prove [than a violation of § 19561.23
Section 1957(a) requires proof that the defendant engaged in a
"monetary transaction" with "criminally derived property" in
excess of $10,000.124 The term "criminally derived property" is
defined as property constituting, or derived from, the "proceeds"
of criminal activity.125 Thus, proof that the defendant participated
in a "monetary transaction" involving "proceeds" is an essential
element of the offense. Because Santos interprets "proceeds" to mean
"net profits," the government arguably must prove that the monetary
transaction represents the "net profits" of specified unlawful
activity. 126 For the reasons previously highlighted, requiring proof of
"net profits" makes it more difficult to convict under § 1957(a),
undermining the effectiveness of the money laundering statute.
Moreover, restricting the reach of § 1957(a) to monetary transactions
involving the "net profits" of specified unlawful activity is not justified
by concerns related to merger. Essential to a violation of § 1957(a) is
proof that the defendant engaged in a "monetary transaction."'127 Thus,
operating an illegal gambling business, selling illicit drugs, or
participating in any other profit-making crime does not, by itself,
122. Rutgard, 116 F.3d at 1291; accord United States v. Allen, 129 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir.
1997).
123. Rutgard, 116 F.3d at 1291 (citation omitted).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a).
125. Id. § 1957(0(2).
126. See United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008) (plurality opinion).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a).
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establish a violation of § 1957. Moreover, the underlying predicate
crimes do not merge with § 1957 and the defendant is not subjected to
the risk of unfair punishment. Merger is simply not an issue in
prosecutions under § 1957. Finally, the intent of § 1957 is to maintain
the integrity of the financial system by deterring criminals from using
banks to transfer dirty money. 128 That purpose is undermined by
restricting § 1957 to monetary transactions involving "net profits"
rather than "gross receipts" of specified unlawful activity. Simply
stated, important policy interests favor a broader definition of
"proceeds" to include the "gross receipts" of unlawful activity.
D. Criminal and Civil Forfeiture of Proceeds
1. Criminal Forfeiture
The use of the term "proceeds" is not limited to the federal money
laundering statutes. Both criminal and civil forfeiture statutes
authorize the forfeiture of illicit "proceeds. 1 29 Left unresolved by the
Santos decision is whether the Supreme Court's restrictive
interpretation of "proceeds" to mean "net profits" applies to the
federal forfeiture statutes. In other words, is the forfeiture of
"proceeds" limited to the forfeiture of "net profits"? More
specifically, are the overhead expenses of a criminal enterprise
exempt from criminal and civil forfeiture? In the criminal setting, the
forfeiture of illicit proceeds is authorized by three major federal
forfeiture statutes. First, 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) authorizes the forfeiture
of "any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the
person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of [a federal drug]
violation." 130 Second, the RICO criminal forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(a)(3), provides for forfeiture to the United States "any property
constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity... in
violation of section 1962." 3 ' Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 982 authorizes the
128. See GURUL, supra note 73, at 120-21.
129. JIMMY GURULU, SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON & MICHAEL O'HEAR, THE LAW OF ASSET
FORFEITURE 193 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE].
130. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added); see also id. § 853(a) (providing that "[in
lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by this part, a defendant who derives profits or other
proceeds from an offense may be fined not more than twice the gross profits or other
proceeds"). Congress distinguishes between "profits" and "proceeds." The terms are not
synonymous under the statute.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
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forfeiture of "proceeds," "gross proceeds," and "gross receipts,"
depending on the particular underlying offense giving rise to
forfeiture. '32
The courts have consistently construed the term "proceeds" to
mean "gross receipts," rejecting the restrictive interpretation that
"proceeds" includes only "net profits" realized from unlawful
activity. For example, in United States v. McHan, the Fourth Circuit
reversed a district court ruling that the costs of drug operations were
exempt from criminal forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853.'3 The court
held that § 853 authorizes the forfeiture of gross proceeds, not
merely the profits accrued from illicit drug trafficking. '34 The court
based its conclusion on several grounds. First, the court observed
that the drug forfeiture statute originally limited criminal forfeitures
for a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise
to "profits obtained.., in such enterprise." 135 However, the provision
was replaced by 21 U.S.C. § 853, when Congress passed the Compre-
hensive Forfeiture Act. 3 6  Section 853(a)(1) now authorizes the
forfeiture of "any property constituting, or derived from, any
proceeds... obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of" a
Continuing Criminal Enterprise ("CCE") offense. 3 ' In using the term
"proceeds," as distinguished from "profits," Congress intended to
broaden the scope of the statute to encompass more than merely illicit
profits derived from drug trafficking. 1
38
Second, the McHan court argued that Congress intended to
subject to forfeiture, pursuant to § 853(a)(1), "[t]he same type of
property [that was already] subject to civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C.
132. Id. § 982; see id. § 982(a)(2)(A)-(B), (6)(A)(ii)(I) (authorizing forfeiture of "proceeds");
id. § 982(a)(5), (7), (8)(B) (authorizing forfeiture of "gross proceeds"); id. § 982(a)(3)-(4)
(authorizing forfeiture of "gross receipts").
133. United States v. McHan, 101 F.3d 1027, 1041 (4th Cir. 1996); THE LAW OF ASSET
FORFEITURE, supra note 129, at 194; see also United States v. Simmons, 154 F.3d 765, 770 (8th Cir.
1998) ("We think the better view is the one that defines proceeds as the gross receipts of the
illegal activity.").
134. McHan, 101 F.3d at 1041-42; THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE, supra note 129, at 194.
135. McHan, 101 F.3d at 1041 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 21 U.S.C. §
848(a)(2)(A) (1982) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) (2006)); THE LAW OF ASSET
FORFEITURE, supra note 129, at 194.
136. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, sec 303, § 413, 98 Stat. 2040,
2044-45 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)); THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE, supra note 129, at
194.
137. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1); THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE, supra note 129, at 194. A CCE
offense involves a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848.
138. THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE, supra note 129, at 194.
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§ 881(a)(6)."' 39 The court observed that the reach of § 881(a)(6)
extends beyond merely forfeiting illicit drug profits.1" Further, the
McHan court posited that "[t]he civil forfeiture provision has never
been interpreted to permit a deduction for the costs of illicit drug
transactions."
41
The McHan court found additional support for its position in the
legislative history of the RICO criminal forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963.142 The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act amended both the RICO
and CCE forfeiture provisions. 143 The court observed that the language
of 21 U.S.C. § 853 closely tracks that of the RICO criminal forfeiture
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1963.144  Thus, the legislative history of
§ 1963(a)(3) was found to be illuminating when interpreting 21 U.S.C.
§ 853.145 The McHan court posited that the legislative history of
§ 1963(a) "reveals that Congress believed '[i]t should not be necessary
for the prosecutor to prove what the defendant's overhead expenses
were' and, therefore, used the term 'proceeds' rather than 'profits'...
'to alleviate the unreasonable burden on the government of proving
net profits."' 46 The McHan court concluded that Congress intended
the term "proceeds" to be given the same meaning under the drug
and RICO criminal forfeiture statutes.1 4' Finally, the court maintained
that sound public policy reasons support the forfeiture of gross
receipts rather than merely drug profits under § 853.148 The court
stated:
Were we to read proceeds in § 853 to mean only profits.., we would
create perverse incentives for criminals to employ complicated
accounting measures to shelter the profits of their illegal enterprises.
The purpose of forfeiture is to remove property facilitating crime or
139. McHan, 101 F.3d at 1041-42 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 211
(1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3394).
140. THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE, supra note 129, at 194.
141. McHan, 101 F.3d at 1042.
142. THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE, supra note 129, at 195.
143. McHan, 101 F.3d at 1042 (citing Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, sec 303, § 413,
98 Stat. 2040); THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE, supra note 129, at 195.
144. McHan, 101 F.3d at 1042; THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE, supra note 129, at 195.
145. THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE, supra note 129, at 195; see McHan, 101 F.3d at 1042.
146. McHan, 101 F.3d at 1042 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, supra note
139, at 199); see also United States v. Riley, 78 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1996) (explaining that
Congress used the term "proceeds" to spare the government the burden of proving net profits);
United States v. Hurley, 63 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 1995) (same).
147. McHan, 101 F.3d at 1042; THE LAW OF ASSET FORFErrURE, supra note 129, at 195.
148. McHan, 101 F.3d at 1041-42; THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE, supra note 129, at 195.
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property produced by crime-all of which is tainted by the ille-
gal activity.1
49
Thus, forfeiture of gross receipts is consistent with the intent of
Congress to attack the economic base of criminal enterprises.
The RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3), authorizes the forfeiture
of the "proceeds" derived from a pattern of racketeering activity.
"The term 'proceeds' as used in § 1963(a)(3) has been construed to
mean the entire amount realized from racketeering activity and not
just the 'profits' made by the defendant. Forfeiture of gross profits rather
than net profits is mandated by the statute."'"5 One court reasoned:
Forfeiture under RICO is a punitive, not a restitutive, measure.
Often proof of overhead expenses and the like is subject to
bookkeeping conjecture and is therefore speculative. RICO does not
require the prosecution to prove or the trial court to resolve complex
computations, so as to ensure that a convicted racketeer is not
deprived of a single farthing more than his criminal acts produced.
RICO's object is to prevent the practice of racketeering, not to make
the punishment so slight that the economic risk of being caught is
worth the potential gain. Using net profits as the measure for
forfeiture could tip such business decisions in favor of illegal
conduct. 151
Construing "proceeds" to mean "net profits" would clearly
undermine the effectiveness of the RICO forfeiture statute.
The money laundering forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1),
authorizes the criminal forfeiture of property "involved in" or
"traceable to" a violation of § 1956 or § 1957.52 The money
149. McHan, 101 F.3d at 1042. The court further opined that the costs of the drug operations
were forfeitable under a "facilitation" theory. Id. at 1041-43. Section 853 directs the forfeiture of
any "property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the
commission of" a felony drug offense. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2) (2006). The court stated that because
the money spent to buy and transport marijuana was used to "facilitate" the defendant's
criminal enterprise, § 853(a)(2) subjects that money to forfeiture. McHan, 101 F.3d at 1042-43.
150. GURULt, supra note 73, at 243 (footnote omitted); see also United States v. Simmons,
154 F.3d 765, 770 (8th Cir. 1998) ("We think the better view is the one that defines proceeds as
the gross receipts of the illegal activity."); United States v. Lizza Indus., Inc., 775 F.2d 492, 498
(2d Cir. 1985) (supporting same proposition); United States v. Saccoccia, 823 F. Supp. 994, 1003
(D.R.I. 1993) (same).
151. Lizza Indus., 775 F.2d at 498-99.
152. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (2006). The criminal forfeiture provision in § 982(a)(1) also
authorizes forfeiture of property "involved in" or "traceable" to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960.
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laundering forfeiture provision does not use the term "proceeds."
5 3
The requirement that the property be "involved in" a money
laundering offense is not limited to money derived from criminal
activity or illicit profits. For example, legitimate funds used to
disguise illegitimate funds are forfeitable as property "involved in" a
money laundering offense. 154 In reaching this conclusion, one court
reasoned:
[Llimiting the forfeiture of funds.. . to the proceeds of the initial
fraudulent activity would effectively undermine the purpose of the
forfeiture statute. Criminal activity such as money laundering
largely depends upon the use of legitimate monies to advance or
facilitate the scheme. It is precisely the commingling of tainted
funds with legitimate money that facilitates the laundering and
enables it to continue.1
55
The Supreme Court's ruling in Santos creates an interesting
dichotomy with respect to the application of § 982(a)(1), the money
laundering forfeiture statute. Santos limits the federal money
laundering statute to financial transactions with illicit profits derived
from specified unlawful activity.' 56 However, § 982(a)(1) authorizes
forfeiture of property "involved in" or "traceable to" a violation of
§ 1956 and § 1957, and courts have construed the forfeiture statute to
include forfeiture of legitimate funds used to disguise dirty money.1
57
Thus, the money laundering forfeiture provision appears to have
greater reach than the federal money laundering statute giving rise to
forfeiture.
Other subsections of § 982 authorize forfeiture of proceeds, gross
proceeds, or gross receipts.158 The potential impact of Santos on these
forfeiture provisions is unclear. For example, does Santos limit
forfeiture of "proceeds" under § 982 to "net profits"? What is the
153. Id. § 982(a)(1).
154. United States v. Trost, 152 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 1998).
155. Contents of Account Nos. 208-06070 & 208-06068-1-2, 847 F. Supp. 329, 334-35
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (first alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Certain Funds on Deposit in
Account No. 01-0-71417, 769 F. Supp. 80, 84-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)).
156. See United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008) (plurality opinion).
157. See United States v. McGauley, 279 F.3d 62, 75-77 (1st Cir. 2002) (affirming jury
instructions that stated "the commingling of tainted funds (mail fraud proceeds) with legitimate
funds is enough to expose the legitimate funds to forfeiture, if the commingling was done for the
purpose of concealing the nature or source of the tainted funds"); Trost, 152 F.3d at 721 ("Money
does not need to be derived from the crime to be forfeited.").
158. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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legal impact of the Santos decision on the forfeiture of "gross
proceeds" authorized by § 982(5), (7), and (8)(B)? Does Santos limit
forfeiture to "gross net profits," whatever that means?
2. Civil Forfeiture
The civil forfeiture of drug proceeds is authorized by 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6). The statute provides that "[a]ll moneys, negotiable
instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended
to be fumished... in exchange for a controlled substance" and "all
proceeds traceable to such an exchange" shall be forfeited to the
United States. 5 9 Civil forfeiture is further authorized under 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(B), which permits forfeiture of any "proceeds" obtained
directly or indirectly from an offense against a foreign nation, if the
offense "involves trafficking in nuclear, chemical, biological, or
radiological weapons technology or material, or the manufacture,
importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance." 160
Additionally, § 981(a)(1)(C) authorizes civil forfeiture of the
"proceeds" of statutorily enumerated crimes, including any offense
defined as "specified unlawful activity" under the federal money
laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7). 16 1  Other provisions
authorize civil forfeiture of gross proceeds or gross receipts. 162
Section 981 also authorizes civil forfeiture of property, real or
personal, which constitutes or is derived from "proceeds" traceable to
a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339C. 163  Section 2339C prohibits the
financing of terrorism. 64 Specifically, § 2339C prohibits directly or
indirectly providing or collecting "funds with the intention that such
funds be used, or with knowledge that such funds are to be used" to
commit enumerated terrorism-related predicate acts. 165 The relevant
predicate acts include offenses within the scope of nine international
counter-terrorism treaties, including, for example, treaties
condemning hijacking, the destruction of aircraft, crimes against
159. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (2006) (emphasis added).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006). Forfeiture of "gross proceeds" is authorized by
§ 981(a)(1)(F). Further, § 981(a)(1)(D) and (E) authorize forfeiture of "gross receipts" for certain
crimes.
161. Id. § 981(a)(1)(C).
162. See, e.g., id. § 981(a)(1)(D)-(E) (forfeiture of gross receipts); id. § 981(a)(1)(F) (forfeiture
of gross proceeds).
163. Id. § 981(a)(1)(H).
164. Id. § 2339C.
165. Id. § 2339C(a)(1).
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internationally protected persons, hostage-taking, and terrorist
bombings.166 Section 2339C further prohibits financing other terrorist-
related acts, including acts of violence directed at any civilian or other
person not taking part in hostilities in a situation of an "armed
conflict, when the purpose of such act.., is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act."
167
If Santos is construed to limit civil forfeiture under 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(H) to the "net profits" from specified terrorism-related
crimes, such a result would seriously undermine the effectiveness of
the civil forfeiture statute. Unlike money laundering, the financing of
terrorism may involve funds derived from legal as well as illegal
activity. "A terrorist sympathizer may choose to support the
activities of a terrorist organization using funds derived from
legitimate business activity or some other legal source." 168 Restricting
§ 981(a)(1)(H) to "net profits" would exempt from civil forfeiture
funds derived from a legitimate source intended to finance acts of
terrorism.
Finally, § 981(a)(2) provides that in cases involving "illegal goods,
illegal services, unlawful activities, and telemarketing and health care
fraud schemes, the term 'proceeds'. .. is not limited to the net gain or
profit realized from the offense." 169 Thus, forfeiture of proceeds is not
limited to illicit net profits. However, in cases of "lawful goods or
lawful services that are sold or provided in an illegal manner, the
term 'proceeds' means the amount of money acquired through the
illegal transactions... less the direct costs incurred in providing the
goods or services."' Thus, the civil forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a), draws a distinction between whether the proceeds were
obtained as the result of engaging in illegal activities or providing
legal goods or services in an illegal manner. 17  Only in cases
involving legal goods or services provided in an illegal manner is the
term "proceeds" construed to exclude direct costs incurred in
providing the goods and services.'72  The Supreme Court's
166. Id. § 2339C(e)(7).
167. Id. § 2339C(a)(1)(B).
168. JiMMY GuRuLt, UNFUNDING TERROR: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE FINANCING OF
GLOBAL TERRORISM 104 (2008).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)(A) (2006).
170. Id. § 981(a)(2)(B).
171. See id. § 981(a)(2)(A)-(B).
172. Id. § 981(a)(2)(B).
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construction of "proceeds" in the Santos decision is more restrictive in
scope.173 Under this interpretation, "proceeds" always means net
profits, regardless of whether the proceeds were obtained as the result
of the commission of illegal activities or lawful goods or lawful
services provided in an illegal manner. 174 Thus, the term "proceeds"
has a narrow meaning under the federal money laundering statute
(illicit profits) after Santos, and a broader meaning under the civil
forfeiture provision, 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)(A) ("not limited to the net
gain or profit realized from the offense"). 175
IV. "PROMOTING THE CARRYING ON" OF AN ILLEGAL GAMBLING
ENTERPRISE
In his plurality opinion, Justice Scalia argued that a restrictive
construction of "proceeds" is mandated, otherwise every payment to
runners, collectors, and winning gamblers in the illegal lottery
operation would constitute money laundering, because such
transactions were intended to promote the carrying on of the
lottery.176  In his view, the same conduct that would constitute
operating an illegal lottery would also support a conviction for money
laundering. Justice Scalia posited that "[slince few lotteries, if any,
will not pay their winners, the statute criminalizing illegal lotteries
would 'merge' with the money-laundering statute." 7 7 As a result
of this merger, lottery operators who ordinarily would be subject to
five years of imprisonment for a violation of the illegal lottery
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a), would face an additional twenty years
for money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). 178  Justice Scalia
further maintained that there is no evidence that Congress intended to
radically increase the criminal sentence for a financial transaction that
is a normal part of the underlying predicate offense and punished else-
where in the criminal code. 79  Finally, interpreting "proceeds" to
mean "profits" would eliminate the merger problem. 180  Justice
173. See United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008) (plurality opinion).
174. Id. ("Because the 'profits' definition of 'proceeds' is always more defendant-friendly
than the 'receipts' definition, the rule of lenity dictates that it should be adopted.").
175. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2006), with id. § 981(a)(2)(A).
176. See Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2026 (plurality opinion).
177. Id. (citation omitted).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2027.
180. Id.
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Scalia declared that "[t]ransactions that normally occur during the
course of running a lottery are not identifiable uses of profits and thus
do not violate the money-laundering statute." '
Justice Scalia's reasoning is seriously flawed and demonstrates a
fundamental misunderstanding of the promotion theory of money
laundering. He seeks to justify his restrictive construction of the term
"proceeds" by his erroneous and unreasonably broad application of
the promotion provision. However, once the promotion provision is
properly understood to prohibit the flow of illicit proceeds back to the
criminal enterprise to capitalize and continue the commission of
specified criminal activity, Justice Scalia's argument proffered to
support a restrictive reading of "proceeds" fails. Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion further reflects an arrogant disregard of the
legislative intent of the MLCA and prior court decisions interpreting
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).1 82 His plurality opinion never even mentions the
legislative history of the MLCA or relevant court decisions
interpreting the promotion provision. 3 The legislative history makes
clear that the federal money laundering statute was aimed at conduct
that follows in time the underlying predicate crime. The money
laundering statute created a new crime, rather than merely affording
prosecutors an alternative means to punish "specified unlawful
activity."'' 84 As noted by another court, "Congress clearly intended
the money laundering statutes to punish new conduct that occurs
after the completion of certain criminal activity, rather than simply to
create an additional punishment for that criminal activity." 85 One
court reached the same conclusion with respect to § 1957, stating that
"both the plain language of § 1957 and the legislative history behind it
suggest that Congress targeted only those transactions occurring after
proceeds have been obtained from the underlying unlawful
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 2026 (rejecting the government's invitation to "speculate" about congressional
purpose, stating that "[wihen interpreting a criminal statute, we do not play the part of a mind
reader").
183. See id. For example, Justice Scalia's plurality decision fails to even mention United
States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991), which held that 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)
requires evidence that the defendant intended to "plow back" illicit proceeds to promote the
carrying on of specified unlawful activity.
184. See GURUL, supra note 73, at 150-51 (citing United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206,
1213 (10th Cir. 1991), and United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479, 485-86 (4th Cir. 1994), abrogated
in part on other grounds by United States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d 530 (4th Cir. 2001)).
185. United States v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 1478 (10th Cir. 1995); accord United States v.
Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 569 (10th Cir. 1992); Edgmon, 952 F.2d at 1213-14.
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activity."' 86  Moreover, the federal courts have repeatedly held that
conducting a financial transaction with the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity that merely facilitates such activity does not
constitute money laundering under the promotion theory."' To
violate the promotion provision, the financial transaction at issue
must follow in time and be distinct from the offense that generated
the illicit funds.
Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) makes it a federal crime to conduct a
financial transaction involving the proceeds of unlawful activity
"with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity."'' 88 This subsection is aimed at deterring "the practice of plow-
ing proceeds of 'specified unlawful activity' to promote that
activity." 189 It differs from § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), the concealment
provision, in that intent to launder, disguise, or conceal the nature or
source of the proceeds is not an essential element of the offense.' 90
The dispositive issue in a § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) prosecution is whether the
defendant engaged in a financial transaction with the specific intent
to reinvest the proceeds to promote the carrying on of specified unlaw-
ful activity, not merely to facilitate the commission of the underlying
predicate offense.' 9' Justice Scalia erroneously interpreted the
statutory language "to promote the carrying on" to mean "facilitate"
specified unlawful activity.' 92  However, if Congress intended
186. Johnson, 971 F.2d at 569.
187. See, e.g., Heaps, 39 F.3d at 486; United States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239, 1246-47 (10th
Cir. 1994).
188. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006); United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1216 (3d Cir.
1993).
189. United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991); see also United States v.
Reed, 167 F.3d 984, 993 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming a money laundering conviction where
defendant made her law office available for drug buyer to drop off money covering debt owed
to drug seller, and for seller's representative to pick up money, promoting prior unlawful
activity); United States v. France, 164 F.3d 203, 205, 209 (4th Cir. 1998) (affirming a money
laundering conviction where defendant used drug money to post bail for a member of a drug
conspiracy, thus furthering drug trafficking activity); United States v. Hildebrand, 152 F.3d 756,
760, 762 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that evidence that monies obtained from scheme to defraud
were used to pay office supplies, secretarial services, office staff wages, and promotional
expenses to promote ongoing scheme to defraud was sufficient to sustain money laundering
conviction under "reinvestment" theory).
190. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), with id. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
191. See GURULE, supra note 73, at 148-49 (citing Jackson, 935 F.2d at 841-42).
192. See United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2026 (2008) (plurality opinion) ("Anyone
who pays for the costs of a crime with its proceeds . . . would violate the money-laundering
statute."). While Justice Scalia does not use the term "facilitate" in the opinion, this certainly
seems to be the way that he interprets "to promote the carrying on."
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§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) to punish whoever engages in a financial transaction
with the criminal proceeds with the intent to "facilitate" or aid and
abet specified unlawful activity, it easily could have said so. At the
very least, using the language "to promote the carrying on" is an
extremely awkward way of saying to "facilitate." Furthermore, 18
U.S.C. § 2, the federal aiding and abetting statute, makes it a crime to
aid and abet the commission of an offense.' 93  Pursuant to § 2,
whoever "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures" the
commission of a federal crime is punishable as a principal.
194
Certainly, Congress did not intend by the promotion theory of the
money laundering statute to merely provide an alternative means of
punishing aiders and abettors of specified unlawful activity. Justice
Scalia's statutory construction of the money laundering statute simply
does not withstand close scrutiny and contradicts the ruling of
numerous federal courts that have considered the issue.
In United States v. Edgmon, the Tenth Circuit analyzed the
legislative intent of the MLCA. 9' The court observed that in the
Senate report for § 1956, Congress expressed the need for a federal
criminal law aimed at curbing the activity of laundering money de-
rived from illegal activity.'96 The Edgmon court stated that "Congress
aimed the crime of money laundering at conduct that follows in time
the underlying crime rather than to afford an alternative means of
punishing the prior 'specified unlawful activity."' 97 In United States
v. Dimeck, the court embraced the Edgrnon court's construction of the
MLCA. 98  The Dimeck court further identified that absent the
additional step by the drug dealer of attempting to launder the
money, the delivery of drug proceeds by the middleman to the drug
seller (or money courier acting on his behalf) did not violate the
money laundering statute.199
In United States v. Jackson, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a money
laundering conviction under the promotion theory where evidence
showed that drug proceeds were used to purchase telephone paging
beepers that were used to communicate with drug couriers to inform
193. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006).
194. Id.
195. United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1213-14 (10th Cir. 1991).
196. Id. at 1213 (citing S. REP. No. 99-433, at 4 (1986)).
197. Id. at 1214.
198. United States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 1994).
199. Id. at 1242, 1247.
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them where to pick up and drop off drug money. 200 The court found
that the use of the beepers was an integral part of the drug operation
and purchasing the beepers was intended to promote the carrying on
of illegal drug trafficking activity.20' Moreover, the financial trans-
actions at issue (purchasing the beepers) were separate from and
followed in time the criminal activity (drug transactions) that
generated the illicit funds.20 2 However, the court in Jackson reached a
different result with respect to money laundering counts based on the
use of drug money to pay apartment rental fees and purchase mobile
car phones. 23 The court found the evidence insufficient to support a
violation of § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the promotion theory.20 4 The Seventh
Circuit concluded that the government failed to prove that the cellular
phones played any role in carrying on the drug operations, and
although the rental payments helped maintain the defendant's
personal lifestyle, the evidence failed to show how this promoted his
205drug activities. To sustain a conviction under the promotion
provision, § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the Seventh Circuit held that the
proceeds must be "plowed back" to promote the carrying on of
specified unlawful activity, not merely used to personally benefit the
defendant.20 6
In Santos, the payment of gambling winnings does not constitute
"plowing back" or reinvesting gambling proceeds to continue the
ongoing operation of the illegal gambling business. Unlike Jackson,
the proceeds were not used to purchase beepers or other equipment
needed to continue or expand the operation of the criminal
enterprise. 7 At most, the financial transactions in Santos were
merely part of the underlying predicate crime of operating an illegal
gambling business. 20 8  Further, the collection and payment of
gambling debts were not transactions separate from and following in
time the criminal activity that generated the illicit funds.20 9
200. United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 1991). The subsequent discussion of
Jackson is taken in part from the discussion of the promotion theory of money laundering in
GURUL9, supra note 73, at 148-49.
201. Jackson, 935 F.2d at 841.
202. See id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 841-42.
207. See United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2022-23 (2008) (plurality opinion).
208. See id.
209. See id.
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In United States v. Heaps, the Fourth Circuit reversed a
defendant's money laundering convictions under the promotion
theory, § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).21° In Heaps, the defendant distributed
illegal drugs to two drug dealers, Beck and Boccia. 211 Beck wired two
money orders to Heaps's girlfriend, one in the amount of $1500 and
the other for $500, to pay for the drugs.212 After the money was wire
transferred, it was placed in a money box in Heaps's house.213 Heaps
was subsequently convicted on two counts of money laundering in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the promotion theory.214
The government predicated its argument that the transfer of the
two money orders was intended to promote the carrying on of
unlawful drug activity on two theories.2 5 First, the prosecution
argued that the transfers of funds were made to establish goodwill for
the promotion of future sales of illicit drugs by the defendant.216
Second, the government maintained that the transfers promoted the
carrying on of unlawful activity by completing the antecedent drug
sales.217 The court rejected the government's first argument, finding
no evidence to support the claim that the payment was made to create
goodwill for future drug transactions.21 8 The Fourth Circuit charac-
terized the payments as being made merely to satisfy an outstanding
debt from completed drug transactions, not to encourage subsequent
drug transactions.219 The court also dismissed the government's second
theory of promotion, reasoning:
Were the payment for drugs itself held to be a transaction that
promoted the unlawful activity of that same transaction virtually
every sale of drugs would be an automatic money laundering
violation as soon as money changed hands. Understood this way,
210. United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479, 486-87 (4th Cir. 1994), abrogated in part on other
grounds by United States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d 530 (4th Cir. 2001).
211. Id. at 480-81.
212. Id. at 481-82.
213. Id. at 482.
214. Id. at 480.
215. Id. at 484.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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§ 1956 would have such reach that it would criminalize the very
same conduct already criminalized by the drug laws.2
The Heaps court concluded that the money laundering statute
was intended to create a separate crime, distinct from the offense that
generated the money to be laundered. 22' The Fourth Circuit followed
the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Jackson, holding that in the absence
of any proof that the drug proceeds were "plowed back" into the
criminal enterprise, the evidence was insufficient to sustain a
conviction under the promotion theory.222 Thus, the mere exchange of
money for illegal drugs, without more, is insufficient to demonstrate
that the financial transaction "promoted the carrying on" of specified
unlawful activity.223
The reasoning of the court in Heaps applies with equal force to
the facts in Santos. Were the collection of gambling debts and
payment of gambling winnings held to be transactions that promoted
the illegal gambling enterprise, virtually every such transaction
would constitute an automatic money laundering violation.
Understood this way, § 1956 would criminalize the very same conduct
criminalized by the illegal gambling laws.224 The Heaps court emphati-
cally rejected such an expansive application of the promotion
provision. 5 The mere collection of gambling receipts and payments
to winning bettors do not constitute money laundering under the
promotion theory. Such transactions are an integral part of the illegal
gambling business and already criminalized by the illegal gambling
statute. Defining the collection of gambling receipts and payment of
winnings as promotion would merely provide an alternative
punishment for operating a gambling business, which was not the
legislative intent. Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) requires an additional
promotional step beyond the operation of an illegal enterprise. Such
transactions must follow in time the commission of the underlying
predicate offense, operating an illegal gambling business.226 For
example, purchasing communications equipment, such as cell phones
and fax machines, could violate the promotion theory of money
220. Id. at 485-86.
221. Id. at 486.
222. Id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 841-42 (7th Cir. 1991)).
223. See id.
224. See id. at 485-86.
225. See id.
226. See United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1213-14 (10th Cir. 1991).
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laundering. Purchasing communications equipment involves a
promotional step beyond the mere operation of the illegal gambling
venture; the mere collection of gambling receipts and payments to
winning bettors do not.227
Justice Scalia was simply wrong when he claimed that "nearly
every violation of the illegal-lottery statute would also be a
violation of the money-laundering statute., 228  While the financial
transactions involving collectors, runners, and winners would violate
the illegal lottery statute, such transactions would not necessarily
violate § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). Only those transactions that followed in
time the collection and payment of gambling debts and were "plowed
back" to promote the carrying on of the illegal gambling enterprise
would violate the promotion provision.229 While those individuals
may be guilty of operating an illegal gambling business, they did not
commit money laundering. Thus, there is no "merger problem."
230
At the same time, if the defendants engaged in a distinct and separate
transaction "plowing back" proceeds to promote the carrying on of
the illegal gambling business, increased punishment would be
justified. Congress intended to punish separately the practice of
plowing back proceeds of specified unlawful activity to promote
the continuation of that activity.231
Justice Scalia also failed to cite any authority to support the view
that the federal money laundering statute was intended to afford
prosecutors an alternative means of punishing individuals that aid
and abet the commission of specified unlawful activity.23' He was
wrong when he stated that anyone who pays for the costs of a crime
with its proceeds would be guilty of money laundering. 233 According
to Justice Scalia, "the felon who uses the stolen money to pay for the
rented getaway car-would violate the money-laundering statute.,
234
Once again, Justice Scalia misconstrued § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), which was
intended to prevent the financing of future criminal activity with
criminal proceeds. In his hypothetical, the financial transaction
would not satisfy the "intent to promote the carrying on" requirement
227. SeeJackson, 935 F.2d at 841.
228. United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2026 (2008) (plurality opinion).
229. Seeid. at 2034 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
230. See id. at 2044-45 (Alito, J., dissenting).
231. SeeJackson, 935 F.2d at 842; Edgmon, 952 F.2d at 1213-14.
232. See Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2026 (plurality opinion).
233. Id.
234. Id.
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if the rental car payment was related to a completed crime.235 If there
were no plans to commit future criminal acts, the payment could not
have been intended to promote the "carrying on" of criminal
activity.236 Simply stated, one cannot promote the "carrying on" of
already completed unlawful activity.237
Justice Scalia further erroneously concluded that giving
confederates their share of the proceeds of criminal activity would
always violate the promotion provision of money laundering.238 He
stated that "any wealth-acquiring crime with multiple participants
would become money-laundering when the initial recipient of the
wealth gives his confederates their shares., 23 9 Whether such trans-
actions constitute money laundering would depend on whether the
payments were intended to promote the commission of future crimes.
The promotion provision looks forward, not backward. If the
payments were intended to pay for past criminal activity, such trans-
actions would fail to satisfy the specific intent requirement "to promote
the carrying on" of specified unlawful activity. 240 However, if
future crimes were contemplated and the payments were intended to
recruit confederates for the commission of such criminal acts, the
payments would constitute money laundering. To sustain a violation
of § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), Justice Scalia would simply require that the
financial transaction somehow facilitated the commission of specified
unlawful activity.241  However, this construction of the money
laundering statute would render the statutory language "carrying on"
superfluous and meaningless. Justice Scalia placed undue emphasis
on the word "promote" and apparently read out of the statute the
reqUirement that the financial transaction promote the "carrying on"
of specified criminal activity. Moreover, if Congress intended the
money laundering statute to criminalize any financial transaction that
235. Id. at 2035 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Alternatively the money laundering statute's phrase
'with the intent topromote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity' may not apply where,
for example, only one instance of that underlying activity is at issue.").
236. See id.
237. But see United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1216-17 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that
there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the deposit of a check amounted
to an "intent to promote the carrying on of" a specified unlawful activity already completed,
namely, embezzlement); United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991) (same
regarding bribery).
238. Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2026-27 (plurality opinion).
239. Id.
240. Seeid. at 2034 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
241. See id. at 2027 (plurality opinion).
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facilitates the commission of predicate crimes, it easily could have
inserted the word "facilitate" into the statute. Instead, Congress used
the language "to promote the carrying on" of specified unlawful
activity.
In sum, Justice Scalia erroneously concluded that any financial
transaction that facilitates the commission of specified unlawful
activity violates the promotion theory, creating a false dilemma (the
so-called merger problem).242  He then narrowly interpreted
"proceeds" to mean "profits" to limit the scope and reach of
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) to address the merger problem. 243  The better
approach is to interpret § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) to require an additional
promotional step beyond the mere commission of the underlying
predicate offense. 2" However, that promotional step must occur after
the completion of the underlying criminal conduct giving rise to
money laundering.24 5  A narrow construction of the promotion
provision avoids any merger problem without undermining the
effectiveness of the money laundering statute.
V. REVERSE MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF
TERRORISM
Justice Scalia's restrictive interpretation of "proceeds" to mean
illicit "profits" would decriminalize conducting a financial transaction
involving money obtained from a lawful source with the intent to
conceal or disguise the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,
including providing financial support to terrorists or foreign terrorist
organizations. For example, assume that an al Qaeda sympathizer
provided funds derived from legal activity, not illicit profits, to a
corrupt Islamic charitable organization with the intention or
knowledge that such funds are to be used to carry out a terrorist
attack. Such conduct would constitute a violation of the terrorist
financing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339C.246 Assume further that the
terrorist fundraiser then deposits the funds into the corrupt charity's
bank account with the intent to disguise the true purpose of the
donation and make it appear that the money was intended to fund
humanitarian activities. Under Santos, the terrorist fundraiser would
242. See id. at 2026-27.
243. Id. at 2027.
244. See id. at 2034-35 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
245. See id. at 2034.
246. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a) (2006).
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not be guilty of money laundering, because the financial transaction
did not involve criminal profits. A similar result would occur under
the material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B, which
criminalize providing material support or resources, including fin-
ancial support, to terrorists or foreign terrorist organizations. 247 After
Santos, conducting a financial transaction with money derived from
specified unlawful activity, including violations of the terrorist
financing and material support statutes, but obtained from a lawful
source, does not violate § 1956(a)(1).
As previously discussed, to sustain a money laundering
conviction under the concealment theory, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i),
the prosecution must prove that (1) the defendant conducted or
attempted to conduct a financial transaction, (2) knowing that the
property involved in the financial transaction represented some form
of unlawful activity, (3) which in fact involved the proceeds of
"specified unlawful activity," and (4) the financial transaction was
conducted with the intent to conceal or disguise the nature, location,
source, ownership, or control of such proceeds. 248 As already noted,
the term "specified unlawful activity" includes over 250 predicate
offenses. 249 The terrorist financing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339C, as well
as the material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B, are
included within the definition of "specified unlawful activity."
250
These criminal statutes punish the provision of financial assistance to
terrorists or foreign terrorist organizations. 25 1 However, the statutes
are not restricted to monetary donations with funds derived from
illicit profits.252  Terrorist financing is prohibited regardless of
whether the funds were derived from a criminal or lawful source.
247. Id. §§ 2339A-2339B, invalidated in part by Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509
F.3d 1122, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the terms "training," "service," and "expert
advise or assistance" based on "other specialized knowledge" were void for vagueness").
248. See GURULt, supra note 73, at 124-25.
249. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (2006); Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2027 (plurality opinion) (citing
MOTIVANS, supra note 3).
250. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D) (defining "specified unlawful activity" to include violations of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-2339C).
251. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C prohibits the unlawful and willful collection or provision of funds for
the purpose of financing terrorist acts. Sections 2339A and 2339B prohibit providing "material
support or resources" to terrorists and foreign terrorist organizations.
252. See infra note 269 and accompanying text. The definition of "material support or
resources" includes "any property," including currency or monetary instruments, and makes no
distinction between clean and dirty money. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1); see also id. § 2339B(g)(4)
(adopting this definition of the term by reference).
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Terrorist financing is similar in several respects to money laun-
dering.2 3 Both offenses involve an element of concealment. 4 Money
laundering is the "process by which one conceals the existence, illegal
source, or illegal application of income, and then disguises that
income to make it appear legitimate. ' 255  The objective of money
laundering is to disguise the source of the illicit proceeds to make it
appear that the funds were derived from a legitimate source.256 "The
money laundering statute criminalizes behavior that masks the
relationship between an individual and his illegally obtained
proceeds. ... ,,257 This is often accomplished through complex or
unnecessary financial transactions intended "to add extra 'degrees of
separation' between [the owner] and the [illegal] source of the
funds."
258
Unlike money laundering, terrorist financing may involve funds
derived from legal as well as illegal activity. A terrorist sympathizer
may choose to support the activities of a terrorist organization using
funds derived from legitimate business activity. Thus, terrorist
financing may involve using legitimate income to finance illegal
activity, which is money laundering in reverse. Regardless of the
source of the funds, the terrorist financier must conceal the true
purpose of the financial donation. The objective is to make it appear
that the funds are being given, donated, or transmitted for a
legitimate purpose, such as funding charitable or social activities. In
the case of money laundering, the concealment element is directed
backwards at concealing the illegal source of the funds. In terrorist
financing, the concealment element looks forward, disguising the
illegal purpose and intended beneficiary of the funds.
The terrorist purpose may be disguised by transferring the funds
through a corrupt organization or fictional intermediary which claims
to have charitable, social, or cultural goals.259 Terrorist financing may
also involve complex or highly unusual financial transactions
253. The discussion of how terrorist financing differs from money laundering is taken
largely from GURULt, supra note 168, at 104.
254. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (the concealment provision of the money laundering
statute); id. § 2339C(c) (the concealment provision of the terrorist financing statute).
255. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 72, at 7.
256. See GURULt, supra note 73, at 120.
257. United States v. Adefehinti, 510 F.3d 319, 322 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
258. United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1129 (11th Cir. 2004).
259. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism pmbl.,
Dec. 9, 1999, S. TREATY DOc. 106-49, at 2, 2178 U.N.T.S. 229.
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intended to disguise or conceal the relationship between the donor
and the illegal purpose of the donation. In both money laundering
and terrorist financing, the owner of the funds seeks to disguise the
money trail, but for different purposes. While the money launderer
seeks to conceal where the money came from, the terrorist financier
attempts to conceal or disguise where the money is going.
Three federal statutes prohibit the financing of terrorism: 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339C (relating to terrorist financing) and § 2339A and § 2339B
(relating to providing material support to terrorists).260 Moreover,
each of these statutes prohibits providing financial assistance to
terrorists with clean or dirty money.261 Section 2339C punishes
providing or collecting funds for terror, making it a crime to
"unlawfully and willfully provide[] or collect[]" funds with the
intention or knowledge that the funds are to be used to carry out (1) a
crime which constitutes an offense within the scope of any of nine
anti-terrorism treaties enumerated in the statute, or (2) another act
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, when
the purpose of the deadly act was "to intimidate a population, or to
compel a government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act." 262 An individual is also criminally liable
if he attempts or conspires to commit an offense under the statute.263
The statute defines "provides" to include "giving, donating, and
transmitting" terrorist funds.264 The term "collects" includes both
"raising and receiving" such funds.26 5 The broader "transmit" and
"receive" language extends liability to persons who knowingly
transfer money to terrorists and terrorist groups. Thus, the provision
of financial services and other administrative assistance to transfer
money globally to fund terrorist activities may be prosecuted under
the statute. "In sum, the donors, fund raisers, and persons or entities
responsible, directly or indirectly, for transmitting terror money may
be held criminally liable for engaging in terrorist financing., 266
260. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-2339B (2006), invalidated in part by Humanitarian Law Project
v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the terms "training," "service,"
and "expert advise or assistance" based on "other specialized knowledge" were void for
vagueness); id. § 2339C.
261. See supra note 252 and infra note 269 and accompanying text.
262. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1) (2006); see GURULt, supra note 168, at 293.
263. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(2).
264. Id. § 2339C(e)(4).
265. Id. § 2339C(e)(5).
266. GURULt, supra note 168, at 104. Section 2339C(c) further makes it a crime to conceal the
financing of terrorism. The statute punishes:
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The terrorist financing statute defines "funds" to include assets of
every kind "however acquired."2 67  Thus, the funds involved in a
§ 2339C violation are not limited to illicit profits. The term
"proceeds" means "any funds derived from or obtained... through
the commission" of a terrorist financing offense. 268 Funds "collected"
or "provided" to finance acts of terrorism may be derived from a
legitimate or illegitimate source.269 Thus, a person can be convicted of
violating § 2339C for financing acts of terrorism with clean or dirty
money.
Section 1956(c)(7)(D) also includes within the definition of
"specified unlawful activity" violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and
§ 2339B, which make it a crime to provide "material support or
resources" to terrorists and foreign terrorist organizations ("FTOs" or
"FTO"). 270  By enacting the material support statutes, Congress
recognized that eliminating material support and resources, including
currency and other financial assistance, to terrorists and FTOs is
critical to preventing terrorist attacks. Among other objectives, the
material support statutes were intended to prevent terrorists from
raising money within the United States, and transferring such funds
outside of the country to finance acts of terrorism.27' As part of the
[Whoever] knowingly conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, ownership, or
control of any material support or resources, or any funds or proceeds of such funds-
(A) knowing or intending that the support or resources are to be provided, or
knowing that the support or resources were provided, in violation of section
2339B of this title; or
(B) knowing or intending that any such funds are to be provided or collected, or
knowing that the funds were provided or collected, in violation of subsection
(a) ....
18 U.S.C. § 2339C(c).
267. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(e)(1).
268. Id. § 2339C(e)(3).
269. See id. § 2339C(c). Section 2339C(c) may provide an alternative means of prosecuting
persons who engage in a financial transaction with the proceeds of violations of § 2339B or
§ 2339C to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of such funds.
The statute punishes concealment and the term "proceeds" is not limited to illicit profits. See id.
§ 2339C(e)(3). Prosecutors could bring criminal charges for concealment until Congress has an
opportunity to amend the federal money laundering statute to explicitly provide that
"proceeds" means "gross receipts."
270. See id. § 1956(c)(7)(D); id. §§ 2339A-2339B, invalidated in part by Humanitarian Law
Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the terms "training,"
"service," and "expert advise or assistance" based on "other specialized knowledge" were void
for vagueness).
271. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 301(a)(6), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247.
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Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Congress
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, making it a federal crime to knowingly
provide material support or resources "knowing or intending" that
they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, various
federal crimes enumerated in the statute.272
Congress enacted § 2339B two years later as part of the 1996 Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). 273 Section
2339B criminalizes knowingly providing material support or
resources to organizations designated by the Secretary of State as
FTOs.274 This provision is primarily aimed at depriving funding and
other resources to terrorist groups. In Humanitarian Law Project v.
Gonzales, the court examined the legislative history of the statute,
stating:
Congress enacted § 2339B in order to close a loophole left by
§ 2339A. Congress, concerned that terrorist organizations would
raise funds "under the cloak of a humanitarian or charitable
exercise," sought to pass legislation that would "severely restrict the
ability of terrorist organizations to raise much needed funds for their
terrorist acts within the United States."
275
The court in Humanitarian Law Project further observed:
272. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 12005(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2022 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A).
273. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 303, 110
Stat. 1214, 1250 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B).
274. 18 U.S.C. § 23391(a). For purposes of § 2339B, a "foreign terrorist organization" is "an
organization designated as a terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act." Id. § 2339B(g)(6). Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1189, authorizes the Secretary of State to designate a group as a "foreign terrorist
organization" if the group meets the following criteria:
(A) the organization is a foreign organization;
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 1182(a)(3)(B) of
this title[)] or terrorism (as defined in section 2656f(d)(2) of title 22), or retains the
capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism[ ]; and
(C) the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of
United States nationals or the national security of the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2006) (footnote omitted).
275. Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-383, at 43 (1995)), enforced sub nom. Humanitarian Law Project v.
Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2007).
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[TIhe AEDPA sought to prevent the United States from becoming a
base for terrorist fundraising. Congress recognized that terrorist
groups are often structured to include political or humanitarian
components in addition to terrorist components. Such an
organizational structure allows terrorist groups to raise funds under
the guise of political or humanitarian causes. Those funds can then
be diverted to terrorist activities.
276
Section 2339A makes it a crime to provide "material support or
resources". "knowing or intending" that they are to be used to prepare
for or carry out certain statutorily enumerated terrorist-related
offenses.277  That is, the statute prohibits knowingly providing
material support or resources to facilitate specified crimes, such as
terrorist bombings.27  By contrast, § 2339B punishes whoever
knowingly provides "material support or resources" to an FTO, with
knowledge that the organization has been designated an FTO, or has
engaged in or engages in acts of terrorism.279
Section 2339A requires proof of a heightened mens rea not
required under § 2339B. To convict for a violation of § 2339A, the
government must prove that the defendant provided "material
support or resources" "knowing or intending" that they are to be
used to carry out certain terrorism-related crimes.280 By contrast, to
prove a violation of § 2339B, the defendant must have knowledge that
the organization is a designated foreign terrorist organization or
engages or has engaged in acts of terrorism. 281 The government is not
required to prove that the defendant intended to further the illegal
aim of the FTO by the provision of material support or resources.
276. Id. at 1137.
277. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a). Section 2339A(a) punishes
[w]hoever provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the nature,
location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or intending
that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of [statutorily
enumerated terrorist-related offenses] or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the
concealment of an escape from the commission of any such violation, or attempts or
conspires to do such an act ....
Id.
278. See id. For example, § 2339A criminalizes the provision of financial assistance
"knowing or intending" that the funds be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a
conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons in a foreign country, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 956.
279. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).
280. Id. § 2339A(a).
281. Id. § 2339B(a).
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Under § 2339B, the donor is criminally liable even if he intended to
fund the purported humanitarian activities of the organization if he
had knowledge that the group had been designated an FTO or engages
in terrorist activities.282 However, § 2339B does not render § 2339A
totally obsolete. For instance, a prosecutor may file charges under §
2339A rather than § 2339B if the material support-type of activity
was not undertaken on behalf of a particular designated FTO or
where the provision of material support benefitted a terrorist group
that has not been designated an FTO.28 3
The term "material support or resources" is a term of art under
the statutes and proscribes various types of assistance and services.
As used in these sections, the term "material support or resources"
means
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency
or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false
documentation or identification, communications equipment,
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or
more individuals who may be or include oneself), and
transportation, except medicine or religious materials.
284
The "material support or resources" proscribed by § 2339A and
§ 2339B includes "any property," tangible or intangible, including
"currency, monetary instruments or financial securities, [and]
financial services. 28 ' The financial support prohibited by the material
support statutes is not restricted to funds derived from an illegal
source.
Prior to Santos, a defendant could be convicted of money
laundering if he engaged in a financial transaction with the proceeds
derived from a violation of § 2339C (terrorist financing), or § 2339A or
§ 2339B (providing material support or resources to terrorists or
FTOs) with the intent to promote the carrying on of acts of terrorism
or to conceal or disguise such funds, even if the money was derived
from a lawful source. However, after Santos, these statutes may only
282. See id
283. See Jeff Breinholt, Case Type: Material Support to Unknown Groups, 51 U.S.
ATrORNEY's BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C.), July 2003, at 30, 30.
284. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (the terms "training," "service," and "expert advise or
assistance," however, were held to be void for vagueness by Humanitarian Law Project v.
Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 2007)).
285. Id.; id. § 2339B(a), (g)(3)-(4).
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serve as predicate offenses for money laundering purposes if the
funds constitute illicit profits.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
MONEY LAUNDERING STATUTE
To undo that harm resulting from the Supreme Court's ill-
conceived decision, Congress should add a new subsection to 18
U.S.C. § 1956(c) and explicitly define the term "proceeds" to mean
"any funds derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through
the commission of specified unlawful activity, and not limited to the
net gain or profit realized from such criminal acts." There is a strong
public policy interest in prohibiting the financial sector from being
used as a conduit to conceal or facilitate criminal activity, especially
acts of terrorism, regardless of whether the money was generated
from lawful or unlawful activity.286 This important policy interest is
undermined by punishing only those transactions with illicit profits.
Next, to avoid the merger problem, Congress should define the
language "to promote the carrying on" of specified unlawful activity
to require proof of a financial transaction that occurs after the
completion of specified criminal activity. The transaction must be
separate and distinct from and follow in time the underlying criminal
activity that generated the proceeds. Further, Congress should make
clear that engaging in a financial transaction that merely facilitates the
commission of conduct already criminalized and falls within the
definition of "specified unlawful activity" is not sufficient. Such
transactions must be committed with the specific intent to capitalize
or expand the commission of specified unlawful activity. For
example, "plowing back" proceeds to sustain the ongoing operations
of the criminal enterprise would satisfy the requirement that the
defendant act with the intent "to promote the carrying on" of
specified unlawful activity. The payment of crime-related expenses
intended to support the continuing operations of the criminal
enterprise would also satisfy the specific intent requirement under the
promotion theory. Other examples include purchasing automobiles,
vessels, and aircraft to transport drugs, as well as purchasing cell
phones, computers, and other communications equipment, and
payment of the salaries of members of the enterprise for the purpose
of sustaining the ongoing operations of the criminal enterprise.
286. See GURULt, supra note 168, at 181-82.
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Congress should further make explicitly clear that one cannot
promote the carrying on of completed unlawful activities. The money
laundering statute's phrase "'with the intent to promote the carrying
on of specified unlawful activity' may not apply where, for example,
only one instance of that underlying activity is at issue." 287  The
promotion provision has no application to a single incident of a
completed crime. Congress should also take this opportunity to
amend 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A), which makes it a crime to transfer
money-any money-into or out of the United States with the intent
to promote specified unlawful activity.288 Congress should enact a
domestic version of that offense, making it a crime to transport,
transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds with the intent
to promote or commit another crime.
Finally, Congress needs to bring clarity and uniformity to the
meaning given the term "proceeds" in the criminal and civil forfeiture
context. The federal forfeiture laws currently authorize the forfeiture of
"proceeds," 289 "gross proceeds," 290 "gross receipts," 291 and "profits,"292
depending on the underlying predicate offense giving rise to forfeiture.
The use of these different terms is confusing and unwarranted.
Congress should amend the forfeiture statutes to define the term
"proceeds" to mean "any property derived, directly or indirectly,
from specified unlawful activity, and not limited to net profits of
unlawful activity." There are strong policy interests, such as
deterring criminal activity and disgorging any property used to
facilitate such activity, that favor forfeiting "any property" derived
287. United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2035 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted).
288. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (2006).
289. Three criminal forfeiture statutes authorizing forfeiture of criminal "proceeds" are: 18
U.S.C. § 982(a)(2), (6)(A)(ii)(I) (2006) (forfeiture for various delineated offenses); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(a)(3) (2006) (RICO forfeiture provision); and 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) (2006) (drug forfeiture
provision). Two civil forfeiture statutes also authorizing the forfeiture of "proceeds" are: 18
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(B)-(C), (H) (2006) (forfeiture for various delineated offenses); and 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6) (2006) (drug forfeiture provision).
290. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(F); id. § 982(a)(5), (7), (8)(B).
291. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(D)-(E); id. § 982(a)(3)-(4).
292. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)(A)-(B). This civil forfeiture statute distinguishes between
cases involving illegal and lawful goods and services. In cases involving illegal goods, illegal
services, unlawful activities, and telemarketing and health care fraud schemes, the term
"proceeds" is not limited to the net gain or profit realized from the offense. Id. § 981(a)(2)(A).
However, in cases involving lawful goods or services that are sold or provided in an illegal
manner, the term "proceeds" means "the amount of money acquired through the illegal
transactions resulting in the forfeiture, less the direct costs incurred in providing the goods or
services." Id. § 981(a)(2)(B). Thus, in the latter case "proceeds" means net profits. Id.
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from criminal activity, not merely net profits. Further, if Congress
seeks to exclude from forfeiture the direct costs of certain criminal
activity, for whatever reason, it should explicitly say so. In other
words, forfeiture of "any property" derived, directly or indirectly, from
criminal activity should be the general rule. Any intent to exempt
crime-related expenses from forfeiture should be expressly arti-
culated in the statute.293
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Santos that "proceeds" means
"profits" undermines the effectiveness of the money laundering
statute. As Justice Alito correctly stated in his dissenting opinion,
limiting the term "proceeds" to mean "profits" would "frustrate
Congress'[s] intent and maim a statute that was enacted as an
important defense against organized criminal enterprises." 294  The
Supreme Court's decision has numerous negative legal effects. First,
it imposes an unreasonable and unwarranted burden on prosecutors
to prove net criminal profits (money acquired less the defendant's
overhead expenses).295 Second, the Court's holding restricts other
provisions of § 1956 and § 1957, including the concealment theory of
money laundering.296 Third, the Santos decision creates confusion
regarding whether the Court's restrictive construction of the term
"proceeds" applies to the federal criminal and civil forfeiture laws.29 v
Finally, Santos limits the application of the federal money laundering
statute to predicate acts that generate illicit profits, decriminalizing
financial transactions with funds obtained from a legitimate source
conducted with the intent to promote the carrying on of terrorism, or
designed to conceal or disguise funds intended to finance terrorist
activities.298 Congress must take immediate action to amend the
293. See, e.g., id. § 981(a)(2)(B).
294. United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2035 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting).
295. See id. at 2038-39.
296. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006). The concealment provision requires proof of
criminal "proceeds." Id. In 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2006), "criminally derived property" means
"proceeds" obtained from a criminal offense.
297. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (2006) (authorizing the criminal forfeiture of "any
proceeds" obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (2006)
(authorizing the criminal forfeiture of drug proceeds); 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (2006) (authorizing
civil forfeiture of "all proceeds" traceable to a federal drug felony offense).
298. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-2339B (2006), invalidated in part by Humanitarian Law Project
v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the terms "training," "service,"
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money laundering statute and enhance the utility of an important
weapon in the prosecutor's arsenal to combat organized criminal
enterprises and foreign terrorist organizations.
and "expert advise or assistance" based on "other specialized knowledge" were void for
vagueness); 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (2006) (criminalizing the provision of any type of financial or
material support to terrorists and foreign terrorist organizations).
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